Analytic Retentive
Matters within Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, & Logic.
-
IS OVER!!!!!!!! Finally, this last week seemed like an eternity. Back to regular posts.
-
Video reblogged from Conscious Code
Bertrand Russell on Smoking
-
the lack of decent posts. The semester is ending and requires my full attention.
-
Quote reblogged from PhilosophyFor a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (via philphys)
-
I was referring more so to the latter-the point at which something non-conscious becomes something conscious. Of course, there are levels of consciousness, but if we presume each subsequent level is "less" conscious (regardless of how we individuate the levels), how would we definitively determine something absolutely "not conscious." I'm beginning to see how panphychism becomes a tenable view to hold, but I'm not ready to commit to something that audacious just yet.
Asked by mdevivo
Though it would seem somewhat impossible to draw the line between sentient and non-sentient beings, the line must be drawn regardless. First, in order to prevent committing the fallacy of demarcation, and second, to actually get some work done.
With this being said, I would like to cite Dan Dennett’s work Kinds of Minds, as the problem of ‘mindedness’ is a moral problem, as you have also recognized. That is, behavior towards those who are minded or not-minded varies significantly, and it would be a moral atrocity to under-attribute a being’s psychic activity. It would also be equally as disastrous to attribute mindedness to those who are not endowed, such as computers, hence why the line must be drawn.
The line is drawn in reference to the ontological question of the subject at hand (i.e. what kinds of minds are there) as between incommunicative minds (conscious, non-human animals) and communicative minds (humans, second-order sentential consciousness).
As to how consciousness evolves out of seemingly non-conscious automata, Dennett provides his three ‘levels’ of consciousness that are developed by the species through evolution.
If you would like more on that topic, I can either refer you to a link of Dennett’s Kinds of Minds, or perhaps e-mail an essay I have written on the topic.
-
Thanks for the response, discussion about these topics are always a novelty for me too. Anyway, I, too, have no serious, tenable doubts that consciousness is a physical process, however I wonder about the [weak] 'emergence' of consciousness when manifest in a suitable cognitive environment. That is, when exactly do billions of lifeless neurons become an environment hospitable for sentience? And to be clear, I don't mean to use 'sentient' as a vague predicate but as a conditional predicate.
Asked by mdevivo
Are you asking for a specific time-frame in which consciousness becomes manifest, or necessary conditions for the emergence of sentience?
-
I agree that the conceivability argument put forth by Chalmers and other dualists has very limited currency as far as demonstrability is concerned. But there's some currency in the claim that evolution would favor zombies over conscious creatures since, if consciousness is an inherently physical phenomenon, it would require a higher expenditure of physical energy than beings who could function without it.
Asked by mdevivo
Though it would require a higher energy expenditure (as you put it), the evolution and development of our consciousness, and more specifically second-order consciousness (i.e. self-reflective and sentential consciousness) is precisely the reason we have been ‘favored’. That is, the evolution of our advanced cognitive functions is due to our consciousness as a physical and natural occurrence in the form of cognitive advantages.
And thank you for showing interest in the discussion! It has been too long since I have had any significant philosophical debate.
-
- According to physicalism all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
- Thus, if physicalism is true, a logically-possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular conscious experience must exist in such a possible world.
- In fact we can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world) and we can not see why it is not logically possible.
- Therefore, physicalism is false.
In David Chalmers’ book The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, an argument is presented (above) that, if the argument was better, would be a good argument refuting physicalism (the stance that consciousness is a result of physical processes) as true. Chalmers states that since a world that is exactly as ours in every regards except for the presence of conscious experience is conceivable, then it is logically possible. Thus, if a world that is similar in every physical respect except for the presence of consciousness or conscious experience was logically possible, then physicalism is false.
What Chalmers fails to realize is, that although his argument is deductively valid (that is, that the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion), his third premise is plagued with an unbacked assumption, mainly, that whatever is conceivable is logically possible, which is just absolutely not true. Many things are conceivable, and logic does not deal in what you think as conceivable (or what others are perceiving, which would be a psychological issue), but in hard facts. Further, he states why he cannot see why such a world would not be logically possible, thus committing the fallacy of demarcation (or, the bald man fallacy). The second thing Chalmers fails to understand is that since consciousness does exist and occur within the natural and physical world, then it must have been developed throughout the history of the physical and natural world, i.e. evolution. Thus, a world with zombies behaving and acting like us in every way conceivable and without the gift of conscious experience, could simply not exist or even be logically possible. Hence, physicalism is true.
-
Photo reblogged from Andrew Foltz-Morrison
Apostolos Doxiadis & Christos Papadimitriou, Logicomix: An Epic Search for Truth
Bertrand Russell is a man after my own heart in these panels.
-
Bertrand Russell on Nietzsche.
-
Video reblogged from Philosophy
A.J Ayer on Logical Positivism
-
Knights and Knaves puzzle 1: Zoey is the Knight and Mel is the Knave. If Zoey were lying, then she'd be the Knave and he the Knight. If she were telling the truth, then he'd be the Knave and she, the Knight. Either way, it's impossible for Mel's statement to be true and for both of them to be the same, so he's lying, and therefore, the Knave, means that Zoey is telling the truth which makes her the Knight. (I hope that's right).
Asked by catalystintheskies
You are correct!
-
One of the most well-reknowned philosophers (and also Professor of Neuroscience at University of Southern California) dealing with matters in the field of Philosophy of Mind, Antonio Damasio gives a very in-depth look into his subject matter which includes emotion and reason in the brain, as well as an argument disproving Descartes’ mind/body problem through scientific inquiry.
Check this guy out. The video is long-winded, but well worth it.
